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Abstract 
Modern developments in the use of information technology within command and control allow 
unprecedented degrees of flexibility in the way teams deal with tasks. These developments, 
together with the increased recognition of the importance of knowledge management within teams 
present difficulties for the analyst in terms of evaluating the impacts of changes to task or team 
composition. In this paper we present an approach to this problem that represents team behavior in 
terms of three linked networks (task, social and knowledge networks) that we have instantiated 
within the integrative WESTT software tool. By automating many analyses of workload and error 
we furthermore allow the user to engage in the process of rapid and iterative ‘analytical 
prototyping’. In addition, we also present an example of the use of this technique with regard to a 
proposed tactical vignette. 
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capability, social networks, knowledge networks, human error, workload. 
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Introduction 
The field of command and control (C2) is undergoing significant changes as the 
result of the gradual adoption of information and networking technologies. 
Indeed, so profound are these coming changes that it is argued that the adoption of 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) as it is termed in the UK, will transform the 
way in which UK armed forces operate: “It offers a new way of not just “doing 
things better” but of “doing better things”” (MoD, 2005). It is envisaged that 
NEC, by linking sensors, effectors, decision makers and other individuals will 
through the rapid and timely sharing of information create widespread shared 
understanding of a situation that will in turn allow swifter actions, based on better-
informed decisions, to be made (MoD, 2005). Another benefit of NEC will be 
increased flexibility and agility within teams as a result of flexibility within 
information sharing and communications to create: “…highly responsive, well 
integrated and flexible joint force elements that have assured access to and 
unprecedented freedom of manoeuvre within the entire battlespace.” (MoD, 
2004). Clearly then, whilst NEC will be based on the roll-out of technology, the 
locus of its effect will be upon human cognition and decision making to enable 
better actions to be made (see Houghton & Baber, 2005).  
 
This situation created by the adoption of NEC technology poses considerable 
challenges for the analyst hoping to understand and evaluate the sociotechnical 
systems it produces: First, the emphasis on agility and flexibility suggests that 
standard approaches to Human Factors techniques may be too time-consuming to 
produce useful guidance; rather a system of rapidly modeling and then 
reconfiguring team performance is required. This general approach is termed 
analytical prototyping and is based on the concept that initial system descriptions 
can be quantatively explored in order to evaluate the potential benefits of 
modification (Baber & Stanton, 1999, 2001) Second, the importance attached to 
the fluid possession and sharing of information prompts us to need to find a way 
of usefully representing and understanding the distribution and use of information 
within the sociotechnical systems that NEC will create. Our proposed solution to 
this problem takes the form of linking knowledge objects to individuals and tasks 
to produce a systems-level rendering of knowledge use. Third, the integration of 
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sensors, effectors and humans suggests the requirement for the production of a 
systems-level depiction of NEC that considers the interaction of both humans and 
technological items. Our approach to this issue is to represent all entities as 
“agents” within the system that have essentially the same characteristics whether 
human or non-human (that is, they can possess and share knowledge and carry out 
certain tasks or operations). By adopting this approach one can therefore 
investigate the impacts of augmenting or even replacing elements of teams with 
new technology on a like-for-like basis and in terms of how they contribute to the 
system as a whole. 
 
In addressing the foregoing issues and allowing analytical prototyping the 
WESTT (Workload, Error, Situational Awareness, Time and Teamwork) software 
tool has a range of possible applications that are not necessarily limited to the 
military sphere. These include the analysis of field data and the evaluation of 
current practice; comparison between actual performance and design/doctrine; 
evaluation of changes to current practice through modeling; and evaluation of 
performance in training and virtual environments. Whilst our approach has been 
motivated primary with regard to military operations, but we believe the WESTT 
tool can be used widely in the study of any organization where C2 and complex 
team/collaborative performance are important elements (e.g., Police, Fire, 
Ambulance activities and commercial logistics operations). It is to be noted that 
whilst WESTT is an integrative approach, bringing together many metrics and 
modes of representation of team activity one is by now means required to 
necessarily use all of its elements; for example for a specific purpose WESTT 
may be usefully employed to generate, say, social networks and error measures 
alone. 
Underlying approach 
Key to the design of WESTT is the contention that, with the advent of network-
enabled systems and the increased acknowledgement of the importance of 
knowledge management in war fighting, fully understanding C2 performance 
requires an appreciation of what happened in a given situation or scenario from at 
least three distinct but closely interrelated perspectives: the tasks being performed 
by the team, the nature of the social network the team is acting within and the 
knowledge being used and exchanged. Thus we suggest that C2 and team activity 
are best understood as being the product of a tightly coupled networks and 
structures wherein the examination of one network requires knowledge of the 
structure of the others. This interrelation is depicted in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship and mappings between task network, social network and propositional 
knowledge networks 
 
This method of representation is consistent with claims that a networked force is 
not one that merely employs a physical communications network, but one whose 
whole operation should conceptually be understood in terms of the complex 
nature of relationships and dynamics that exist between entities (e.g., Atkinson & 
Moffat, 2005) Whilst WESTT is ostensibly a software tool, it should also be noted 
it implies (to some extent) a particular methodological approach to the study of 
team and C2 behavior and a particular theoretical stance on the nature of human-
centered systems. An implication of this view is that changing an element of one 
network has repercussions in the other two networks. For example, adjusting 
manning to meet performance targets in the task network will have repercussions 
for both the social network within the team and for the distribution and flow of 
knowledge within the team, both of which will have further repercussions upon 
task performance itself. These changes may of course be either beneficial or 
harmful to overall performance. WESTT then allows analysts to investigate these 
complexities to prevent unforeseen damage occurring both in terms of the 
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network topographies (e.g., creating bottlenecks in information flow) and in terms 
of metrics of predicted error, workload and task duration. More positively this 
approach also allows analysts to produce original and non-obvious solutions to 
problems (e.g., it is possible that what appears to be a manning problem may 
actually be a symptom of an underlying knowledge distribution problem that can 
be solved without changing the manning itself).  
 
In the next section of this paper we will describe in some depth the various 
modules that make up the WESTT software package. In doing this we shall make 
reference to an example of how WESTT can be used to support a use-case 
investigation of a hypothetical military action described by Lloyd (2004). The 
scenario describes a brigade-level action in urban terrain in which Brigade HQ 
plays the central command and control role, both passing reconnaissance from 
Special Forces and a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) down to the Urban 
Combat Team and also communicating with a convoy.  We used WESTT to 
evaluate a change in network architecture suggested by Lloyd (2004) wherein 
rather than information being routed via Brigade HQ, a direct data-feed between 
the Urban Combat Team and the two reconnaissance assets (Special Forces and 
the UAV) is added, in line with NEC-style thinking about the provision of 
information directly to “on the ground” decision makers and effectors.  WESTT 
allows rapid construction, assessment and modification of designs: the figures and 
data reported here took no longer than 20 minutes of keyboard time to produce, 
although it should be of course noted that the time spent to come to an 
understanding a scenario can clearly be highly variable depending on the expertise 
of the individual and the complexity of what is being studied. Where data required 
for a WESTT analysis were not present in the original text we have taken the 
liberty of inventing some points of data informed by the text, as we would expect 
an analyst to be able to employ their professional judgment about a situation. 
The main data table 
At the heart of WESTT, in terms of both the user interface and the underlying 
method of analysis is the data table. The data table, as the name implies, simply 
displays an ordered list of events over time together with the agents (human or 
technological) involved and relevant details (labels breaking the action down by 
phases and other descriptive material can be added for example). In essence the 
data table is very similar to a spreadsheet and has similar editing capabilities, 
indeed data can readily be imported to WESTT from Microsoft Excel. In addition 
to the familiar spreadsheet functions, one can also ask WESTT to check that all 
the observations in the table fall in chronological order to prevent errors in 
analysis. A screenshot of the main data table is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The WESTT data table 
 
Representation of task structure: Operation sequence diagram and 
UML renderings 
On the basis of the information in the main data table, WESTT will automatically 
draw and label an Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD). The OSD has been 
widespread in the ergonomics community since the 1950s and provides a means 
of representing the activity of agents within a system over the course of a mission 
as Meister (1985) pointed out, “The OSD can be drawn at a system or task level 
and it can be utilized at any time in the system development cycle provided the 
necessary information is available. It can aid the analyst in examining the 
behavioural implementation of design alternatives by permitting the comparison 
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of actions involved in these design alternatives.” [p. 67]. However, the use of the 
OSD has hitherto been beset by problems in their creation “…the task of drawing 
a complex OSD can be extremely cumbersome and expensive.” (Meister, 1985, p. 
68). Various attempts have been made to automate the drawing of OSDs 
(particularly during the 1980s), although there are few if any commercial products 
that are currently available to do this. WESTT therefore fills this gap (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Operation Sequence Diagram for the Lloyd (2004) urban operations scenario. 
 
In addition to the OSD, WESTT can also automatically generate Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) diagrams, namely, a Sequence diagram and a Use-
case diagram). Whilst the OSD may be familiar to human factors and operational 
research experts, in engineering (and particularly software engineering) the UML 
system is popular and widely understood. Thus to make the tool useful to as wide 
an audience as possible and to facilitate communication between human factors 
analysts and engineers involved in the production of C2 technology we decided to 
add these UML options. The Sequence diagram (see Figure 4) is very similar to 
OSD in so far as it portrays much the same information (actions by agent over 
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time) albeit using slightly different layout for its symbology. The Use case 
diagram displays the associations between individual actors and the tasks (termed 
use cases herein) that they are involved in. By offering a range of representations 
of the data we allow the analyst to pick the most relevant to their needs at the 
time. For example, if one is interested in which agents are collaborating on 
particular tasks but have no interest in the timings involved, the Use case diagram 
may be a more preferable rendering of the information then the OSD or the UML 
Sequence diagram.  
 
 
Figure 4.  UML sequence diagrams. The left hand pane depicts a version of the scenario without 
linkages between Special Forces and UAV reconnaissance and the Urban Combat Team, the right-
hand pane shows the scenario with those links, and the event that derive from them instantiated. 
Note that these differences are clearly apparent at a glance. 
 
Social network analysis 
Social network analysis is based on the simple intuition that the structure of 
relationships between actors plays a determinant role in the performance or action 
of that social network and the actors within it. It is worth noting from the outset 
that social network theory is based upon empiricism and mathematics (indeed, 
modern social network analysis techniques would not exist had Graph Theory not 
undergone rapid development as a mathematical field in the 1970s). Today, social 
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network theory is widely used across myriad disciplines; it can be used as a tool to 
investigate organizations, decision making, the spread of information, the spread 
of disease, mental health support systems, anthropology, child development etc. 
Most recently there has been a great deal of enthusiasm for the using the 
techniques of social network analysis (SNA hereon) to study the internet and 
connections between both web pages (e.g., Google ‘page rank’ technology) and 
internet users (e.g., see Adamic, Buyukkoten & Adar, 2003).  In terms of studying 
the architectures encountered in the increasingly complex Network Enabled 
command and control networks (both pre-designed and formed ad hoc) SNA 
would appear to be the logical choice of analysis tool. Modelling of military 
command and control networks using this general approach has already yielded 
intriguing results (e.g., Dekker, 2002).  
 
Teamwork is therefore explored and quantified through methods of Social 
Network Analysis. On the basis of the central data table WESTT automatically 
extracts a Social Network diagram that graphically portrays the interconnections 
between agents within a system. Each agent is represented as a node and is 
connected to others via lines termed “edges”. Again, whilst there are products that 
will draw social networks, WESTT is notable for allowing one to go directly from 
empirical data to a full social network. Qualitative analysis of social networks can 
yield interesting results in and of itself; one can for example identify nodes that 
are acting as hubs that connect other nodes. In some cases this function may not 
have been deliberately assigned to an individual with implications for their 
performance in other tasks. In Figure 5 we see social network outputs that show, 
with regard to the urban operations tactical vignette discussed earlier, the change 
to the topography of the network extra reconnaissance to Urban Combat Team 
linkages provide.  
 
 Figure 5. Social networks. The left-hand social network shows the number of communications 
between agents in terms of thickness of line. The right-hand social network adds linkages between 
reconnaissance assets and the Urban Combat Team. This notably introduces extra redundancies; 
even if something happens to Brigade HQ it is clear from the right-hand social network that vital 
reconnaissance data will be available to the Urban Combat Team and those who are linked to 
them. By contrast, in the left-hand social network we can see that there is relatively little 
redundancy; if something happens to Brigade HQ the network will be shattered in four isolated 
units. 
 
As well as giving the analyst a visual representation of the relationships between 
agents, which can be used to understand the general character of the social 
network, the data on which it is based can be analyzed using algorithms and 
statistical techniques (for a comprehensive review see Wasserman & Faust, 1992). 
For our purposes these metrics fall into two main camps; measures of the activity 
of nodes and measures that pertain to the topography of the network. Each class of 
metric provides a different perspective on the structure and performance of the 
social network. A measure of node activity implemented in WESTT is 
Sociometric status, which gives an indication of the contribution a given node 
makes to the overall amount of communication in the network.  
 
The other two social network metrics currently instantiated in WESTT are 
geodesic distance and centrality that relate more directly to the physical form of 
the network. Geodesic distance refers to the shortest possible path between two 
nodes in a network and thus can be assumed to be shortest path for a 
communication to pass between two agents. Typically, the greater the geodesic 
distance between two agents, the longer information will take to propagate from 
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one to another and the greater the risk that information will lose its value both 
because of the degradation encountered in inaccurate reception or retransmission 
(as in a game of ‘Chinese whispers’) and in terms of the information pertaining to 
a rapidly changing situation being rendered inaccurate before it reaches its 
eventual recipient. If the information in question is intelligence this might mean 
plans are formed or orders issued that are inappropriate to the extant situation with 
the result that clumsy, uncoordinated or even hazardous actions are taken. 
Centrality is an overall indication of how close a node is in terms of geodesic 
distance from the other nodes in the network. 
 
Measures of sociometric status and centrality for the two variations on the urban 
operations scenario are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1. 
Without extra links 
Agent 
Sociometric 
status Centrality
sf 6 4.526316
jfsfcc 6 3.583333
divhq 9 6.142857
jflcc 6 4.526316
bdehq 18 6.615385
uav 6 4.3
convoy 6 4.3
bghq 9 4.777778
uct 6 3.44
 
Table 2. 
With extra links between reconnaissance assets and the Urban Combat Team. 
Agent 
Sociometric 
status Centrality
sf 10.5 5.142857
jfsfcc 7 3.789474
divhq 10.5 5.538462
uct 14 4.8
jflcc 7 4
bdehq 21 5.538462
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uav 10.5 4.5
convoy 7 3.6
bghq 10.5 4.5
 
Note for example that increased connectivity raises sociometric status for most 
nodes, but that the minor changes have adjusted the balance of power within the 
network; Special Forces assets are now increasingly influential and central within 
the network. This means that they now play a far more important role within the 
network but also that their loss or infiltration of their communications would have 
an increasingly profound impact upon the wellbeing of the mission. 
 
Representing system knowledge structure: Propositional networks 
In addition to importing and representing the observational data, WESTT supports 
the construction of what are termed Propositional Networks. The basic approach 
is for the analyst to collect information from debrief, interviews, procedure 
manuals and other sources, to define the ‘knowledge objects’ relevant to the 
mission. These knowledge objects are then connected by linkages based on 
semantic propositions that define their linkage (e.g., IS, HAS, KNOWS), thus a 
network of knowledge is produced (see for example, Anderson, 1983). In terms of 
constraining what a proposition can be we take Anderson’s approach that a 
proposition is a basic statement, “…the smallest unit about which it makes sense 
to make the judgment true or false” (Anderson, 1980, p.102).  To-date we have 
found the best way to elicit knowledge objects has been to use the Critical 
Decision method for structuring interviews. The Critical Decision method (Klein, 
1989) is a form of critical incident technique.  According to Klein (1989), “The 
CDM is a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to 
actual non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision making” (p. 
464).  In our implementation of this approach, the interview proceeds through a 
series of four stages: briefing and initial recall of incidents; identifying decision 
points in specific incident; probing the decision points; and finally checking.  
 
In terms of WESTT itself, the knowledge objects are entered into a matrix which 
allows the analyst to define the relationship between the objects (see Figure 6).  
 
 Figure 6 Knowledge object matrix with propositions 
 
WESTT is then able to automatically provide a graphical representation of the 
‘space’ of knowledge objects that are involved in the mission (Figure 8).  
Typically, this network is then presented to Subject Matter Experts (SME) in 
order to validate the level of detail and the inclusion of specific knowledge 
objects. Once the network has reached an acceptable state, it can be subjected to 
network analysis in a similar way to the Social Networks to identify trends in the 
relationships between information. It is this network of propositions that embodies 
the novel conceptualization of Situation Awareness used by WESTT. Rather than 
focusing on aspects of ‘awareness’, we are more concerned with defining the 
‘situation’. In this work, we view the situation as comprising a collection of 
objects about which the agents within the system require some knowledge in order 
to operate effectively. Nodes in a PN can be easily associated with specific agents 
through color coding. This provides an intuitive representation of ‘who knows 
what’ during the phases of an incident, which can be useful for considering gaps 
in awareness, requirements for shared knowledge or potential for conflicting 
interpretations of the same knowledge. WESTT provides a facility to “play back” 
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the spread of activation in the propositional network so the analyst can watch the 
spread of knowledge use and sharing over the duration of the scenario.  
 
Figure 7. Estimated propositional network for an urban operations scenario. In terms of the NEC-
related changes that might be made to the social network and the task, we can see these have little 
impact upon the structure of the propositional network, but do affect who shares different 
knowledge objects and at what point in time they are shared. That the items are shared suggests we 
may have some confidence that a consistent operational picture is held across the team. 
Workload, Error and Time metrics. 
The final part of WESTT is the calculation of workload, error and time metrics. 
In many forms of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), an approach is taken that is 
analogous to Failure Mode Effect Consequence Analysis (FMECA). This is a 
standard engineering approach that defines failure modes for specific elements of 
a problem. In HRA approaches, an element might be a task and a failure mode 
might be “done too early/too late”. WESTT uses this notion for its initial (analyst 
driven) inspection of operations. Each operation can, from a pop-up menu be 
assigned one or more specific failure modes. The resulting table this produces 
shows operation by failure mode. 
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Given that each operation is made up of specific tasks, the assignment of time to 
tasks in simply a matter to looking values up in a database. These times are 
collected from the literature and represent unit-times for specific tasks. WESTT 
can combine these times into a simple linear model of performance, i.e., by 
summing all the times in manner that is similar to keystroke level models (e.g., 
Card, Moran & Newell, 1983). As an alternative we are currently implementing 
an method of extending this analysis into a critical path model (e.g., Gray, John & 
Atwood, 1993; Baber & Mellor, 2001) which can better account for the 
parallelism of human activity. Essentially the critical path technique is about 
identifying which activities may safely occur in parallel, which tasks are 
dependent on the completion of other tasks before they commence and thus 
ultimately which tasks are critical to maintaining a schedule and which are not.  
 
The study of Human Factors has developed a range of measures to describe how 
busy a person is in terms of how much cognitive and physical activity they are 
required to perform. In terms of predictive analysis of workload, the general 
approach would appear to follow the notion that changes in activity can be 
mapped over time to provide an index of loading (Parks & Boucek, 1989); this 
could be considered as a function task scheduling (Moray, Dessousky, Kijowski 
& Adapathya, 1991) or in terms of competition between cognitive resources 
(North & Riley, 1989). At present WESTT provides a simple metric for workload 
based on the operations performed by a given agent during a defined phase of the 
mission. This is derived from the OSD and provides an index of ‘operations 
demand’. However, workload is also a cognitive function and subsequent 
developments of the workload algorithms in WESTT will take into account the 
number and complexity of knowledge objects (as represented in the Propositional 
Network) to provide a scaling factor for the operations demand. In our analysis of 
the urban operations vignette where additional links between reconnaissance 
assets and the Urban Combat Team were implemented, we found that because 
information is duplicated there is no extra time cost associated with its production, 
but that workload increases for the Urban Combat Team, as they are now 
provided with extra communications events (between themselves and the 
reconnaissance assets) rather than a single communications event between 
themselves and Brigade HQ. 
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Discussion 
This paper has described the rationale behind and use of the WESTT software 
tool.  It is envisaged that WESTT will provide a novel and useful means of 
representing team activity, and will be particularly beneficial for exploring future 
configurations in command and control system structure. By supporting analysis 
at several levels, it is possible to explore the effects of changes to system 
structure, the introduction or removal of knowledge objects (which might be 
operating procedures, cultural expectations or tactical information) or the 
replacement of human agents with technology, on operational effectiveness and 
system performance. Through the convergence of measures and modes of data 
representation in WESTT, an analysis using the software can be used to indicate 
barriers to team activity such as deficits and asymmetries in expertise and 
situational awareness, pinch-points and sub-optimal social and communication 
network configurations.  
 
Because these analyses and metrics are largely automated WESTT can be used as 
an analytical prototyping tool allowing one to rapidly compare different 
approaches by manipulating data in the main data-table. By supporting analysis at 
several levels, it is possible to explore the effects of changes in system structure, 
the introduction or removal of knowledge objects (which might be operating 
procedures, cultural knowledge or tactical information) and the replacement or 
augmentation of human agents with technology. One way of understanding how 
the various networks are linked is to consider that within WESTT, for each agent 
(that is, a human or technological entity) we have the following information 
available: what they have done or are doing (operation sequence diagram); what 
they know (knowledge objects embedded in a propositional network); what their 
modes of failure might be at various points (error) and how they spend on task 
(time/workload).  To answer a design question using WESTT we might want to 
select from a subset of these attributes from a subset of agents. Alternatively we 
may survey the overall structures of knowledge, social nets and tasks to gain an 
appreciation of the functioning of the system as an entity in itself. 
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As an integrative tool, many individual aspects of WESTT have already been 
subject to extensive testing, academic discussion and validation. For example, 
there is a large literature discussing the uses of social network modeling (e.g., 
Wasserman & Faust, 1992) and much of the workload, error and time metrics are 
in common use by Human Factors practitioners. The use of “plug in” databases of 
task time and error also allow one to employ pre-validated and reliability-tested 
estimates.  
 
Validation of WESTT as a whole has so far consisted of discussions with Subject 
Matter Experts regarding the face validity of the outputs and usefulness of 
comparing different types of representations as an aid to the investigation by 
analysts of complex datasets (this has taken place with regard to Police, Fire and 
power industry scenarios). In addition to this we are currently following two more 
formal approaches to validation. First, we are comparing WESTT predictions with 
outcomes delivered by simulation tools (such as MicroSAINT). Second, and 
perhaps more importantly given an analysis tool’s ultimate duty is to produce 
metrics and data that accord with reality itself, we are involved in ongoing 
experimental work looking at the effects of different network structures and 
technologies upon the activities of teams of human participants in different games 
and scenarios and comparing the outputs of WESTT analyses against those real 
world patterns of performance.  
 
Future directions for the development of WESTT include adding more metrics as 
appropriate and in particular “headline figures” which more succinctly describe 
the performance of the system as a whole. 
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